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INTRODUCTION
The “public disclosure” jurisdictional bar (PDJB) to the False
1
Claims Act (FCA) limits federal jurisdiction over qui tam actions.
The PDJB states in part that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an
action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allega2
tions or transactions.” The purpose of this section is to prevent
1

31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006). The “public disclosure” jurisdictional bar itself
is at § 3730(e)(4). The FCA creates a qui tam action, allowing relators, often called
whistleblowers, to bring suit on behalf of the government against corporations engaged in fraudulent behavior. Id. § 3730(b). The term “qui tam” is a shortening of the
Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur”—“who as well
for the king as for himself sues in this matter.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th
ed. 2004).
In addition to creating a right of action, the FCA further encourages whistleblowing through a financial incentive and provides protection against employer retaliation.
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (“If the Government proceeds with an action brought by a
[relator], such person shall . . . receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim.”); id. § 3730(h) (“Any
employee who is discharged, . . . or in any other manner discriminated against . . . by
his or her employer because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee or others in furtherance of an action under this section . . . shall be entitled to
all relief necessary to make the employee whole.”).
2
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). The full text of the bar reads,
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon
the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person
bringing the action is an original source of the information.
Id. (footnote omitted). Throughout this Comment, and without loss of accuracy, this
provision is shortened to exclude the last portion, reading “in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.” While this shortening removes an instance of syntactic
ambiguity (in the attachment height of the “in” clause, see infra note 63 and accompanying text (describing attachment-height ambiguity)), it is not an important ambiguity
to this analysis, and the sentence lacks any real semantic meaning if this phrase modifies anything other than “public disclosure.” Further, the last part of the phrase—
“unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information”—is a subordinate clause, introduced by
the subordinating conjunction “unless,” and can be safely ignored for purposes of this
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3

“parasitic” lawsuits —suits brought by individuals who have no real
connection to the underlying dispute between the government and a
private contractor that are filed in hopes of reaping a large reward
4
under the damage-sharing provision of the FCA. However, in giving
effect to the PDJB, the courts of appeals have split over precisely when
an action should be considered “based upon” a public disclosure.
There are two competing interpretations of the PDJB: The majority of circuits interpret the provision to bar any action supported by
5
the same information that has been publicly disclosed. The minority
view gives weight to the source of the information—it requires that
the action “both depend[] essentially upon publicly disclosed infor6
mation and [be] actually derived from such information.” Through
careful and rigorous analysis of both the statutory language and the
purpose that it serves, this Comment argues that the minority rule is
both the only natural reading of the statute and the most effective implementation of congressional intent.
This Comment first defines the problem clearly. Part II then considers the statutory text within a rigorous analytic framework adopted
from the field of linguistics. As linguistic analysis may be unfamiliar to
many readers, this Part is accompanied by a discussion of the value of
linguistics to statutory interpretation and a description of the analytical model. Following the textual analysis, the Comment, in Part III,
examines other, nontextual considerations in interpreting the PDJB.

analysis. See generally ANDREW RADFORD, TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR 133-37 (1988)
(discussing subordinating conjunctions and their syntactic role in sentences).
3
United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, L.L.C., 496 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir.
2007) (quoting United States ex rel. Gear v. Emergency Med. Assoc. of Ill., Inc., 436
F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 2006)), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1246 (2008).
4
A qui tam plaintiff is entitled to fifteen to twenty-five percent of any proceeds
resulting from the action or settlement of the claim. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
5
The opinions adopting the majority rule in each jurisdiction are United States ex
rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 2005); Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health System Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1045-47 (8th Cir. 2002); United States
ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 940 (6th Cir. 1997);
Federal Recovery Services, Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1995); Cooper v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 1994); United States ex
rel. Springfield Terminal Railway Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 653-55 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United
States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1158 (2d
Cir. 1993); Chen-Cheng Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1417 (9th Cir. 1992); United
States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Industries, Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552-53 (10th Cir. 1992).
6
Fowler, 496 F.3d at 737 (quoting United States ex rel. Feingold v. AdminaStar
Fed., Inc., 324 F.3d 492, 497 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1347-50 (4th Cir. 1994) (adopting the minority
view of the PDJB).
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The analysis concludes that the minority rule represents both the best
statutory interpretation and the most sound policy implementation.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
This Comment considers actions brought under the FCA by individuals who have direct, independent knowledge of transactions that
have been publicly released by another source. The structure of the
PDJB is twofold: first, it establishes those actions over which federal
7
jurisdiction is denied, and second, it creates exceptions to this denial
for actions brought by the Attorney General or an “original source” of
8
the publicly released information underlying the action. At first
blush, the “original source” exception appears to cover the case of an
individual who sues on information obtained independently of a pub9
lic release. Indeed, the language defining an “original source” provides further support for this reading: “‘[O]riginal source’ means an
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the informa10
tion on which the allegations are based . . . .”
Despite the above discussion, there are several reasons to prefer
treating this Comment’s hypothetical whistleblowers as entirely outside the reach of the PDJB, rather than as original source exceptions:
1. The statutory language states that the PDJB does not reach
these actions. While in many instances the phrasing of the ju11
risdictional bar is quite unclear and ambiguous, on this par7

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B).
9
But see Aaron P. Silberman & David F. Innis, The Supreme Court Raids the Public
Disclosure Bar: Cleaning Up After Rockwell International v. United States, PROCUREMENT
LAW. (Section of Public Contract Law, ABA, Chicago, Ill.), Summer 2007, at 1, 20 (noting that “whether a relator must have been the catalyst for a public disclosure in order
to qualify as an original source” is a critical issue left unanswered by the Supreme
Court in Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397 (2007)).
10
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
11
The Supreme Court, in a single opinion regarding the PDJB, has wrestled with
two separate and unrelated linguistic ambiguities. First, the court decided that the “allegation[s]” of § 3730(e)(4)(B) are separate from the “allegations or transactions” of
§ 3730(e)(4)(A). Rockwell Int’l Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1407-08. Second, the Court ruled
that “‘information’ in [§ 3730(e)(4)(A)] and [§ 3730(e)(4)(B)] means the same
thing.” Id. at 1408. Continuing on, however, the Court found the notion that “‘information’ in [§ 3730(e)(4)(A)] refers to the information underlying the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions” to be “highly questionable.” Id. This interpretation
of the statute seems tortured—particularly for such an ordinary-meaning proponent as
Justice Scalia, who authored the opinion—though perhaps not more tortured than the
language of § 3730(e)(4) itself.
8
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ticular point it is clear. And although the definition of an
“original source” may include all individuals with independent
knowledge of facts supporting the action, the analysis need
not reach that question if the action is not barred by the PDJB
in the first place.
2. The statutory purpose of encouraging whistleblowers to
come forward is served only when those whistleblowers are actually able to recover. By subjecting these actions to “original
source” jurisprudence, the likelihood of recovery—and therefore of whistleblowing—is decreased because whistleblowers
must meet a heightened requirement at all stages of litiga12
tion.
3. Exempting these actions from the PDJB reduces a contractor’s incentive to strategically disclose damaging information
in a convoluted form, in order to prevent potentially whistleblowing employees from filing suit. 13
This Comment therefore proceeds under the assumption that the
“original source” exception is not the appropriate solution to the
problem and argues that the PDJB simply does not apply to cases
where the plaintiff has obtained information independently of the
14
public disclosure.

12

As a jurisdictional provision, the PDJB can be invoked at any time during litigation. For example, if a litigant begins a qui tam action based solely on her personal
and independent knowledge, but determines through discovery—or later—that the
case turns on information in the public domain and of which she is not an original
source, her stake in the case is lost. See id. at 1408-09.
13
Courts have read the PDJB to bar actions based upon publicly released information even where that information is “not readily comprehensible to nonexperts.”
United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 655 (D.C. Cir.
1994). Thus, a contractor could, in theory, strategically design a public release of records to include inculpatory material, but in such a form that it does not immediately
appear suspect. The release, if successful, would remove the possibility of an employee’s profiting from a qui tam action, but it would not subject the contractor to any
real risk of exposure.
14
Some courts have noted a concern that this interpretation eviscerates the utility
of the “original source” exception. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Minn. Ass’n of Nurse
Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1045 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The majority of courts have considered it inconceivable that Congress would have drafted the
statute so poorly as to have included a provision that could never have any effect.”).
For a discussion of why this concern is unfounded, see infra note 113 and accompanying text.
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II. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE
It is perhaps tautological to state that, when one considers the legislative acts of Congress, “the plain language of the enacted text is the
15
best indicator of intent.” Indeed, whenever an individual speaks, the
listener’s natural response is to determine the meaning of the speech
and attribute that meaning to the speaker as her “intent.” Without
such a system of assigning meaning and intent, communication would
be impossible, regardless of whether the speech at issue is spoken in
conversation or written in the United States Code. Speech in any
form is, however, rarely precise enough to yield only one interpretation, which can make intent quite difficult to find. On this point, the
field of linguistics can provide very useful tools to determine when
language is—or is not—ambiguous. Employing these tools, one can
see that, despite the disagreement over its proper interpretation, the
linguistic interpretation of the PDJB is unambiguously clear.
This Part considers the so-called plain meaning of the PDJB in a
novel, systematic way. Rather than comparing dictionary definitions,
this approach relies on a model for the technical linguistic analysis of
16
statutory language.
The first section provides a background argument for why linguistic analysis bears on plain-language statutory interpretation. The second section lays the foundation for the model,
which is built on relatively simplified linguistic principles. The final
section applies the model to the PDJB’s statutory text, demonstrating
that the minority rule truly “holds the trump card, the plain-language
17
interpretation.”
A. Why Linguistic Analysis of the PDJB
Given the current proclivity of the Court towards “plain meaning”
18
interpretation of statutory law, and the disarming proposition that
19
plain meaning is derived from “common sense,” it is perhaps unsur15

Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 232 (1993).
For a particularly troubling example of dictionary comparisons, see infra note 54.
17
United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, L.L.C., 496 F.3d 730, 738 (7th Cir.
2007), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 1246 (2008).
18
See Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1437, 1440-41 (1994) [hereinafter Looking It Up] (identifying the plain-meaning rule as
one of the “most significant manifestations” of the Supreme Court’s increased focus on
textualism in statutory interpretation).
19
See, e.g., Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 89-90 (1823) (“[W]here the
words of a law . . . have a plain and obvious meaning, all construction, in hostility with
such meaning, is excluded. This is . . . a dictate of common sense . . . .”).
16
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prising that opinions relying heavily on plain meaning are also heavy
20
21
on intuition and Webster’s Third, but light on analytical rigor.
A
more rigorous analysis is, however, possible. Human linguistic intuition is not only susceptible to technical study, but it is actually under22
stood quite well. Further, the emphasis on “plain meaning” in the
context of statutes is misplaced. Human language is a complex system
23
capable of infinite meaning and riddled with ambiguity—yet, despite
this complexity, the speaker’s intended meaning is usually discerned
24
by her audience. As the context shifts from that of a single speaker
orating to an audience toward the speech-by-committee model of the
legislature—where words are written rather than spoken—the ability
25
of the audience to discern intent is notably diminished. Thus, the
20

See Looking It Up, supra note 18, at 1438-40 (discussing the Supreme Court’s increased reliance on dictionary definitions in the 1980s and early 1990s).
21
A November 2008 search of federal case law on Westlaw for [“syntactic theory”]
returns no results, while [“semantic theory”] returns a single result, which discusses the
difference between pragmatics and semantics in a footnote. See Am. Home Prods.
Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 689 n.13 (3d Cir. 1982). A more general search for [linguistics /p (“plain meaning” or “ordinary meaning” or “plain language”)] returns only
three results, of which none actually implements linguistic analysis, and one flatly
states that “[p]roper construction does not require resort to all possible refinements of
technical legal linguistics.” Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 769 (9th Cir.
1948). Expanding the query to [linguistic! /p (“plain meaning” or “ordinary meaning” or “plain language”)]—and thereby including many results that use “linguistic”
colloquially, rather than to refer to the formal study of linguistics—increases the number of results to 190, but it does not reveal any fuller treatment of the subject. A typical
example states that “it is not the responsibility or function of this court to perform linguistic gymnastics.” St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S.
772, 791 n.4 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Alabama v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 366, 369 (5th Cir. 1980)). The brackets around the search-string examples above indicate the start and end of search queries, as the quotation marks are
part of the queries.
22
For a discussion of just how complex, and how well understood, the problem of
language intuition is, see RAY JACKENDOFF, PATTERNS IN THE MIND: LANGUAGE AND
HUMAN NATURE 3-7 (1994).
23
See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND 71 (enlarged ed. 1972) (“It
seems clear that we must regard linguistic competence—knowledge of a language—as
an abstract system underlying behavior, a system constituted by rules that interact to
determine the form and intrinsic meaning of a potentially infinite number of sentences.”).
24
One interesting exception to this rule is poetry, in which the point is often to
exploit the ambiguity of language. See generally SOON PENG SU, LEXICAL AMBIGUITY IN
POETRY (1994). However, poetic ambiguity is not typically found in legislation—but
see Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732 n.4 (2006) (plurality opinion), in which
Justice Scalia chides Justice Kennedy for reading the Clean Water Act as endorsing a
“poetic usage of ‘waters.’” See also infra note 54.
25
Indeed, at least one linguist has argued that the work done by pragmatics—the
use of nonword cues, such as tone or physical motion, to convey meaning—must be
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courts’ ability to intuit “plain meaning” from legislation is strained.
And if achieving the “correct” reading of complicated language is a
goal of the legal system, the judiciary ought to consider the technical
nature of that work and adopt the appropriate tools. This consideration is no more than is asked of courts in other areas. For example,
any court could reasonably intuit how much compensation would be
appropriate for lost future wages, yet the public—practitioners, juries,
and observers—insists upon actuarial calculus in reaching enforceable
26
judgments.
The PDJB has been subject to much intuitive linguistic scrutiny by
the federal courts. The meanings of many words and phrases—
notably “information,” “allegations,” and “transactions”—have been
27
questioned and challenged in the Supreme Court, and at least one
court of appeals has considered the meanings of these terms sepa28
rately. This scrutiny, however, has been conducted with no indication of which analytical method was being imposed. The existing circuit split over the interpretation of “based upon” makes the PDJB a
timely subject for consideration under a linguistic model.
In the past, academics with formal training in law and linguistics
have often shied away from the use of linguistics as a decision rule in
29
the judicial process. Perhaps more to the point, there has been (and
remains) great concern that judges will—and often do—apply incorrect linguistic analysis to the case at hand, making it appear that their

done by syntax in written speech. See Richard A. Rhodes, Scope in Discourse: Pragmatics
or Syntax?, in COOPERATING WITH WRITTEN TEXTS: THE PRAGMATICS AND COMPREHENSION OF WRITTEN TEXTS 589 (Dieter Stein ed., 1992).
26
Indeed, the judiciary has become so accustomed to considering economic testimony on lost wages that even extremely speculative testimony has been admitted.
Consider the following example:
When calculating the lost wages of a college student who died in a rollover accident—and whose parents say he planned to become a lawyer—a federal
judge has ruled that an economic expert witness may be allowed to testify that
one possible calculation of his lost wages would be premised on a lifelong career as a practicing lawyer—possibly up to the age of 89.
Shannon P. Duffy, Testimony on Lost Wages OK’d in Fatal Accident Case, LEGAL INTELLIMay 10, 2006, at 1.
27
Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1407-09 (2007).
28
See United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 65354 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (considering the definitions of “allegations” and “transactions” and
positing an algebraic formula for determining if either exists).
29
See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 178 (1993) (“[W]hen
judges choose to rely on linguistic argumentation to justify their decisions, incoherence will quickly become the rule . . . .”).
GENCER,
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decision is grounded in plain meaning when in fact neither intuition
30
nor scientific analysis of the text supports the decision. This problem is compounded when the level of “linguistic analysis” performed
31
by courts rarely rises above “dictionary shopping.” However, the fact
remains that the Supreme Court is moving in the direction of plain32
meaning analysis. Any argument against the use of plain meaning,
given the Court’s current support for this technique, would be an ex33
ercise in futility. One could have made similar arguments against
judicial reasoning from economics—the other modern social science
recently given an opportunity to transform judicial thinking—as early
34
methods applied by judges were quite crude. These early attempts at
increasing the analytical rigor of judicial decisions have, however,
produced an entire field of study and a significant increase in judicial
35
understanding of economic principles.

30

Professor Solan refers to this tendency as a “temptation” to avoid writing difficult decisions. See id. at 187 (“[I]f judges were to accept a few more of these opportunities [to avoid interpretive difficulties], breaking away from this temptation, I believe
along with many others that our judicial system would ultimately be well served.”).
31
See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court,
30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 297-300 (1998) (considering the ramifications of judicial use of
dictionary definitions and the pitfalls of selecting between different dictionaries and
definitions).
32
See Looking It Up, supra note 18, at 1440-42.
33
Indeed, it appears that scholars are recognizing the Court’s devotion to the
plain-meaning rule and accepting that judges ought to be educated about linguistics,
rather than advised to avoid it. See generally LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA,
SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2005) (considering various
linguistic and psycholinguistic aspects of American criminal law and expressing a desire
to improve the system by enhancing the understanding of human linguistic ability).
34
Consider United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(italics added), in which Judge Learned Hand set forth the famous “Learned Hand
Formula”: “if the probability be called P ; the injury, L ; and the burden, B ; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P : i.e., whether B < PL .” This is a
very crude cost-benefit model and is almost entirely impracticable in most negligence
cases, yet it proved revolutionary in jurisprudential thought in tort law.
35
The current state of law and economics is not, however, beyond criticism. Indeed, one astute critique—that an economic perspective on law is not necessarily an
objective perspective—applies with equal force to legal linguistic analysis. See, e.g., Ugo
Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383, 412 (2003) (“In the United States today, law and economics has been finally unseated from the throne of legal objectivity, so that its normative recipes need a new contingent and local legitimization in order to compete with
those of a variety of opposite political strategies.”).
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The strong public sense that judges should uphold the law “as
36
37
written,” and not “legislate from the bench,” supports the use of
linguistics as a decision mechanism. This public pressure can encourage judges to rely on incorrect linguistic judgments in order to base a
decision on a seemingly unassailable premise: that the judge was deciding not who was right or wrong, but what Congress had actually
38
enacted—thus binding the judge’s hand. But public sentiment also
fundamentally supports a rigorous linguistic framework for statutory
construction. While formally correct linguistic analysis cannot provide
resolution to all questions of interpretation, it can provide guidance
in the way that proper economic analysis provides guidance—by limiting the number of possible outcomes and identifying those that are
analytically sound.
A simple example demonstrates why linguistic interpretation cannot provide an independently conclusive tool in construing statutes.
Consider a law that provides for no syntactic ambiguity of interpreta39
tion: “Thou shalt not kill.” This law follows a very simple tree struc40
41
ture and allows for only one syntactic reading : the subject, “thou,”
is prohibited from “killing.” Whether a defendant has violated this
law will, however, depend upon the semantic and pragmatic interpretation of “kill.” Will majority and dissenting opinions argue over
36

Note that in certain cases, however, public opinion is for judicial rewriting of
the law precisely because the text as written is unambiguously in conflict with the statutory purpose. The most obvious example of this is the “and/or rule,” by which judges
may read whichever conjunction actually performs the work intended by the legislature. See SOLAN, supra note 29, at 45-55 (discussing the and/or rule in depth).
37
See Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 195-97 (2007) (noting the increasing use of the buzz
phrase “legislating from the bench” in Congress).
38
As Solan has argued,
[T]he deck is not only stacked linguistically. To the extent necessary to
achieve certain results, technical analysis of the language is abandoned entirely in favor of broad policy considerations. Perhaps the decisions in all of
these cases are the best ones possible under the circumstances. Even if we assume so, the result is reached at the expense of selective use of linguistic
analysis in such a way as to compromise the analytical integrity of the system
producing the decisions.
SOLAN, supra note 29, at 87.
39
Exodus 20:13 (King James).
40
For an explanation of tree structures, see infra Part II.B.
41
This statement is a small fib. The attachment of the negative “not” to the tree
may be ambiguous, but not in such a way as to affect the meaning. That is, the tree
could connect “not” with “shalt” or with “kill,” but in either structure the overall meaning remains the same.
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whether the meaning is “to deprive of life: put to death: cause the
42
43
death of” or “to slaughter . . . for food”? Will the putative court
note the profound lack of restriction of “kill” to the act of ending a
human life? It is hard to imagine that the biblical commandment contemplates extension of the rule beyond the killing of a human—
particularly given the Bible’s earlier grant to man of “dominion over
the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle,
and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth
44
upon the earth.” While linguistic analysis can go as far as construing
the problem as one of defining “kill,” the ultimate resolution of this
question must come from elsewhere. Thus, even the simplest case of
apparent plain meaning must be informed by more than the text presented. The overall statutory framework, its stated purpose, and whatever else can be gathered of legislative intent must be considered in
making an informed decision.
B. The Model
In conducting statutory interpretation, the modern Supreme
Court has shown a propensity toward textualist argument, as exemplified in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s remark that “the plain language of
45
the enacted text is the best indicator of intent.” At the same time,
there is no traditional or established judicial framework from which to
discern plain meaning. At the outset, there are effectively three options: (1) the dictionary approach, (2) the intuitive-meaning approach, and (3) the analytical-syntax-and-semantics approach.
The first of these methods is the one used most often by the
courts—or, rather, it is the method of analysis most often explicitly
46
acknowledged by the courts. As previously mentioned, the modern
42

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1242 (2002).
Id.
44
Genesis 1:26 (King James). Invoking this separate section of the Bible recalls the
statutory canon that one section of law should not be read to render another section
superfluous. This canon is referenced in at least one case dealing with the PDJB, as
discussed infra note 81.
45
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 232 (1993).
46
See Lawrence M. Solan, Finding Ordinary Meaning in the Dictionary, in LANGUAGE
AND THE LAW 255, 277-78 (Marlyn Robinson ed., 2003) (noting the increasing reliance
on dictionaries as tools for determining the ordinary meaning of statutory language).
Note, however, that explicit acknowledgement of a mode of analysis may not indicate
that it is the true basis for a decision. See id. at 258 (“[The use of dictionary definitions] stops making sense when the dictionary definition is either more or less precise
than the word’s ordinary meaning. When that happens, judicial resort to the diction43
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Supreme Court has markedly increased over previous Courts its cita47
tions to dictionaries. The second method, intuitive interpretation,
is, however, likely the most common method of analysis actually employed by the Court. While it is rarely, if ever, explicitly noted, intuitive interpretation accounts for the vast majority of how all law—and
indeed, all speech—is analyzed. This reliance on intuitive interpretation is necessary because technical analysis of every phrase, as required by the dictionary approach, would be impractical.
The function of speech is to convey meaning, and the purpose of
codified law is to communicate the rules of society in a knowable
48
form. The philosophical goal of written law—to provide fixed socie49
tal structure—depends primarily upon the knowability of the law.
Written law can provide structure only if the law is understood as hav50
ing a particular meaning by those who read it.
This understood
meaning, in turn, rests upon the ability of the written law to convey
51
meaning through language.
The importance of intuition to legal-language interpretation
should not be understated. It is easy to lose sight of the intuitive nature of language in the midst of cases turning on “precise” lexicographical definitions. A famous example is President Clinton’s ques52
tioning of the meaning of the word “is” before a grand jury. When,

ary becomes nothing more than a vehicle for masking the exercise of judicial discretion.”).
47
See Looking It Up, supra note 18, at 1438-39.
48
Cf. PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 36-40 (1999) (discussing the printing
press’s role in shifting the foundation for the meaning of English law from common
understanding to the written text).
49
See Dolores A. Donovan, Codification in Developing Nations: Ritual and Symbol in
Cambodia and Indonesia, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 693, 706-07 (1998) (“[I]t would be difficult to take issue with Aristotle, Grotius, and Portalis, that the purpose of written law is
social ordering . . . .” (citing ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 51-52 (Benjamin Jowett trans.,
Random House 1943) (350 B.C.))).
50
Or, at the very least, the law must be understood by those who enforce it. The
adage that “ignorance of the law is no excuse” implies that—so long as the law is understood by governmental actors—laws can be enforced to police society regardless of
public awareness. In an intuitive sense, however, laws are much more effective in social ordering if the public is aware of their general content ex ante, rather than being
informed of a legal requirement only during ex post judicial proceedings resulting
from a lack of social order.
51
See, e.g., Philip Marshall Brown, The Codification of International Law, 29 AM. J.
INT’L L. 25, 25 (1935) (considering dictionary definitions of “codification” in explaining the value of written law).
52
Kenneth Starr recounted President Clinton’s testimony in his report to Congress:
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however, attention is not explicitly called to the imprecision and ambiguities of language, our natural inclination is to accept our linguistic
53
intuition at face value. The trouble with linguistic intuition, though,
is that it is highly personal; we have no real way of determining
whether one person’s interpretation of a phrase or sentence is “correct” in the sense that it is honestly what the interpreter believes it to
mean. Thus, the intuitive meaning of a law is likely to be enforced in
a case in which there is agreement among the parties as to what the
law means, and not in cases in which the meaning of the law is con54
55
tested. This proposition is borne out in federal case law.

It depends on what the meaning of the word “is” is. If . . . “is” means is and
never has been, . . . that is one thing. If it means there is none, that was a
completely true statement. . . . Now, if someone had asked me on that day, are
you having any kind of sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky, that is, asked me a
question in the present tense, I would have said no. And it would have been
completely true.
OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, REFERRAL TO THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES PURSUANT TO TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, § 595(C) n.1091
(1998), reprinted in THE STARR REPORT: THE FINDINGS OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
KENNETH W. STARR ON PRESIDENT CLINTON AND THE LEWINSKY AFFAIR 325 n.1091
(PublicAffairs 1998).
53
Our ability to make these intuitive judgments is a matter of considerable study.
See JACKENDOFF, supra note 22, at 48-49 (analogizing intuitive judgments that a sentence is ungrammatical to intuitive knowledge that certain drawn structures are physically impossible). The act of determining a sentence as grammatical or not is known
as “marking.”
54
It is important to note that, even in an utterly honest society, intuitive interpretation of the law would not resolve every problem. Ambiguities are prevalent in human language, such that even if parties agree that different readings are possible, they
will likely disagree as to whether one or another reading is in fact the law. Further, the
mere fact that an individual understands a phrase to have a certain meaning cannot be
proof that the individual responsible for uttering the phrase intended that meaning.
Take, for example, the term “waters” in the Clean Water Act, which can be interpreted
in several ways. In Rapanos, there was no argument between the various court opinions
over whether the different Justices’ interpretations were possible, but rather whether
they were the most appropriate. One footnote in Justice Scalia’s opinion is of particular note:
Justice Kennedy observes that the dictionary approves an alternative, somewhat poetic usage of “waters” as connoting “[a] flood or inundation; as the waters have fallen. . . .” It seems to us wholly unreasonable to interpret the statute as regulating only “floods” and “inundations” rather than traditional
waterways—and strange to suppose that Congress had waxed Shakespearean
in the definition section of an otherwise prosaic, indeed downright tedious,
statute. The duller and more commonplace meaning is obviously intended.
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732 n.4 (2006) (plurality opinion) (bracketed
alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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Given the incentives to distort the meaning of legal language, a
mechanism by which strained or impossible interpretations of language can be rejected seems desirable. Modern linguistic theory, with
its emphasis on natural understanding, provides such a mechanism.
There is a wealth of research in linguistics that is founded, essentially,
upon the immediate reactions of listeners to various sentences as
“grammatical” or “ungrammatical”—or, more simply, what “sounds
56
right.”
By analyzing sentences deemed grammatical and ungrammatical, researchers have uncovered patterns in intuitive understand57
ing of language. These patterns led to the discovery of rules and
structures governing human language and have developed into a body
of knowledge concerning what real-world statements actually mean.
Perhaps the most important linguistic tool for uncovering the
meaning of sentences is the syntax tree, which can relate a great deal
of information regarding the relationships between words in a sen58
tence. While the flow of words in speech and on the page is linear,
linguistic analysis shows that our thought process in interpreting
59
speech is hierarchical. One can think of the tree as a more evolved
version of the grade-school sentence diagram. Each word is assigned a
category, and connections are drawn between neighboring words in a
branching structure according to the relationship between the words
of the sentence. The resulting structure bears a resemblance to an
upside-down tree—hence the name. For example, the phrase “the sky
is blue” is diagrammed as follows:

55

For example, the parties in Rockwell International Corp. v. United States agreed that
“the phrase ‘information on which the allegations are based’ refer[red] to the information on which the relator’s allegations are based.” 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1407 (2007). This
agreement informed the Court’s acceptance of that reading in the face of structural
and semantic ambiguity. Conversely, courts may invent “ambiguity” where none exists.
See infra note 90 (discussing the Third Circuit’s finding of syntactic ambiguity in the
FCA jurisdictional bar not because the language is ambiguous, but because the authors
could have chosen different language).
56
See JACKENDOFF, supra note 22, at 48-49 (providing examples of how grammatical/ungrammatical linguistic marking works).
57
See, e.g., ELIZABETH A. COWPER, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO SYNTACTIC THEORY: THE GOVERNMENT-BINDING APPROACH 1-6 (1992).
58
See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES ch. 4 (12th prtg. 1976) (outlining basic phrase structure and tree diagrams). Alternatively, some modern theorists
have tried to “flatten” syntactic analysis—though even these methods require a certain
level of hierarchical tree structuring. See, e.g., PETER W. CULICOVER & RAY JACKENDOFF,
SIMPLER SYNTAX ch. 4 (2005) (describing a reduced-hierarchy syntax model that retains a good deal of hierarchical structure).
59
See sources cited supra note 58.
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Figure 1: A Simple Sentence Diagram
D
The

N
sky

V
is

60

Adj.
blue.

The same phrase is represented by the following tree structure:
Figure 2: A Simple Sentence Tree

61

IP
DP
D
the

Iƍ
NP
N
sky

I
-PST

VP
V
is

AP
A
blue

By determining the hierarchical structure of a text, it is possible to
determine the various readings that the text might allow. Put negatively, the tree is often persuasive evidence that a proposed reading is
not, in fact, possible. For example, the sentence “Paul served dinner
to him” cannot mean that Paul served himself dinner, solely because
the structure of the sentence precludes Paul serving as the antecedent
of “him.” To see that only structure can account for this, consider
that “Paul’s friend served dinner to him” is ambiguous: the reader
62
doesn’t know whether “him” refers to Paul or another male.
60

In this diagram, the word “the” is marked with a “D” rather than the familiar
“Art.” for article. In linguistics literature, words such as “the” are referred to as “determiners” rather than articles. See, e.g., VICTORIA FROMKIN & ROBERT RODMAN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE 67 (6th ed. 1998) (noting that “the articles the and a/an
[are] part of the class of determiners”).
61
In the tree, branches are called “nodes” and are labeled with a marker that denotes what role the node plays in the cognitive process of determining meaning.
These markers are derived from the category of the “head” element, which is the
noun, verb, determiner, adjective, etc., that, in English, is the upper-leftmost element
in the node. Thus, “IP” stands for “inflection phrase”; “I” stand for inflection; “DP”
stands for “determiner phrase”; “NP” stands for “noun phrase”; “VP” stands for “verb
phrase”; PST stands for “past tense” (in this figure, marked with a negative sign to denote present tense); and “AP” stands for “adjective phrase.” The prime notation indicates an intermediary node. In later diagrams, “PP” stands for “prepositional phrase,”
and “OrP” stands for “‘or’ phrase.”
62
See generally COWPER, supra note 57, at 152-55 (developing binding theory, which
describes the licensing of pronouns and their coreferents).
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For slightly more complex sentences, the syntax trees may reveal
structural ambiguities. In these cases, the syntax tree is not unique, but
rather may take one of two or more forms. For example, consider the
63
sentence “Sherlock saw the man using binoculars.” Without further
context, this sentence may mean that Sherlock witnessed a man who
was using binoculars, or that Sherlock himself used binoculars to spy
on the man. The following two trees illustrate each case:
Figure 3: The Man Using Binoculars
IP
NP
N
Sherlock

Iƍ
VP

I
+PST

DP

V
saw
D
the

NP
Nƍ

AP

A
N using
man

NP
N
binoculars

Figure 4: Sherlock Using Binoculars
IP
NP
N
Sherlock

Iƍ
VP

I
+PST

Vƍ

V
saw
DP
D
the

AP
NP

N
man

63

A
using

NP
N
binoculars

This example, and the analysis of its structural ambiguity, is borrowed from
Tamina Stephenson, 24.900 Mini-Lecture on Semantics 1 (Mar. 14, 2004), http://
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As the syntax trees show, the ambiguity arises from the location of
the attachment of the phrase “using binoculars” to the tree. Figure 3
illustrates that in the lower position, attached to the noun phrase
(NP), “using binoculars” modifies “the man.” Figure 4 illustrates,
however, that in the higher position, attached to the verb phrase (VP),
64
“using binoculars” modifies “Sherlock.”
The ambiguity therefore
does not arise from any variation in the meaning of “using binoculars,”
but rather from the structure of the phrase itself.
In addition to the syntax tree, formal linguistics has produced a
functional tool for dealing more directly with the meaning of individual words and phrases. Treating words as “functions,” linguistics has
adopted the lambda calculus from formal logic as a tool for describing
65
meanings of words and phrases as functional forms. Combined with
a hierarchical understanding of sentence structure, lambda calculus
allows for thorough analysis of the meaning of phrases and sentences.
The accepted tools of formal linguistic analysis have proved valu66
able to the study of human language, and they can be valuable tools
for the interpretation of the law. Their integration into legal discourse is likely to increase understanding of the law, particularly in
the context of plain-meaning analysis. In the judicial context, they
may be viewed as analogous, in some respects, to the so-called “decision rules” that some scholars argue the Supreme Court employs in its
67
constitutional analysis. These decision rules are concrete, practica-

ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Linguistics-and-Philosophy/24-900Spring-2005 (follow link
starting “1BB”; then follow “0” link; then follow “sem lecture.pdf” link).
64
In a traditional grammatical sense, “using binoculars” here serves as an adverb,
and therefore could be said to “modify” the verb “saw.” In a semantic sense, however,
“saw” cannot be modified by “using binoculars,” because a non-entity cannot actually
“use binoculars.” The reader must interpret that Sherlock is the individual using binoculars, thus “using binoculars” is correctly understood as modifying “Sherlock.” Cf.
id. at 4-5.
65
See, e.g., RONNIE CANN, FORMAL SEMANTICS 115-126 (1993) (explaining the use
of lambda calculus in formal semantics); GENNARO CHIERCHIA & SALLY MCCONNELLGINET, MEANING AND GRAMMAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEMANTICS ch. 7 (1990) (explaining the use of lambda abstraction in natural-language semantics). A full discussion of lambda calculus is beyond the scope of this Comment.
66
To see how linguistic tools have changed in the recent past, while producing
valuable insights in all incarnations, compare CHOMSKY, supra note 58, at 26-33, with
CULICOVER & JACKENDOFF, supra note 58, at 108-48.
67
See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 167
(2004) (outlining the “decision rules” model of constitutional theory, which argues
that the rules used to make decisions are separate from the underlying “operative
propositions” of the Constitution).
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ble rules that seek to put the abstract “operative propositions” of the
Constitution into effect—for example, applying “strict scrutiny” (a decision rule) as a means to give effect to “equal protection” (an opera69
tive proposition). Just as decision rules cannot precisely track opera70
tive propositions —for the simple reason that the rules have to be
practical, while propositions preserve a more abstract notion of jurisprudence—the linguistic tools available to study human language do
not necessarily describe human language faculties with complete accuracy. This lack of precise fit is not an impediment to the use of the
model; rather, it is an admonishment to remember that the model is
not necessarily reality. As with any tool, linguistic analysis should be
seen as one factor in statutory construction, and not the entirety of
71
the process.
C. Application of the Model to the PDJB
Having established a rigorous framework from which to determine the meaning of the PDJB, it is now possible to consider the merits of the rules proposed to interpret the law. The PDJB states that
“[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section
72
based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions.”
The majority of courts interpret this to mean that the action is sup73
ported by the same information that has been disclosed. The minority rule requires that, in addition to satisfying the majority rule, the ac74
tion be “actually derived from such information.”
The Seventh
Circuit, in deciding Fowler, claimed that its minority interpretation of

68

Id. at 9.
See Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the
Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1676-80 (2005).
70
See id. at 1658-67 (providing factors that contribute to divergence between operative principles and decision rules).
71
Though Professor Solan would generally have judges avoid linguistic arguments
altogether, his analysis of the “and/or rule” shows an acceptance that linguistic phenomena play a real role in understanding the law. See SOLAN, supra note 29, at 53-55.
For an explanation of how linguistic analysis—and, by extension, “plain meaning”—
cannot provide full answers in virtually any case, see supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
72
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006).
73
For a full list of opinions adopting this rule, see supra note 5.
74
United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, L.L.C., 496 F.3d 730, 737 (7th Cir.
2007) (quoting United States ex rel. Feingold v. AdminaStar Fed., Inc., 324 F.3d 492,
497 (7th Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1246 (2008).
69
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the FCA jurisdictional bar, also adopted by the Fourth Circuit,
76
“holds the trump card, the plain language interpretation.” As presented in Fowler, this claim bears no support beyond its bald assertion.
The goal of this section is to provide the Seventh Circuit’s missing linguistic analysis, which ultimately supports its assertion. This analysis
requires two steps: first, a semantic construction of the phrase “based
upon” to discern its correct meaning, and second, a construction of
the phrase’s syntactic structure in order to identify each element’s
role and its relation to each other element.
1. Determining the Semantic Content of “Based Upon”
Beginning with the phrase “based upon,” the most natural instinct
of a reviewing court would of course be to look up the contested
77
phrase in a dictionary. Interestingly, Black’s Law Dictionary provides a
legal definition for the phrase “based on” in the realm of copyright
78
law: “Derived from, and therefore similar to, an earlier work.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary provides the following, which is
79
of little help: “to use as a base or basis for . . . used with on or upon.”
“Base”—the noun—is, in turn, defined as “foundation,” among other

75

See United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1349 (4th
Cir. 1994) (“[W]e hold that [qui tam plaintiff] Siller’s action was only ‘based upon’ the
disclosures in the SSI lawsuit if Siller actually derived his allegations against [defendant] BD from the SSI complaint.”).
76
Fowler, 496 F.3d at 738; see also Siller, 21 F.3d at 1349 (“We are unfamiliar with
any usage, let alone a common one or a dictionary definition, that suggests that ‘based
upon’ can mean ‘supported by.’ [We prefer] the plain meaning of the words enacted
by Congress over our sister Circuits’ as-yet unconsidered assumptions as to the meaning of those words . . . .”).
77
See Cler v. Ill. Educ. Ass’n, 423 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e will ‘frequently look to dictionaries to determine the plain meaning of words.’” (quoting Sanders v. Jackson, 209 F.3d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 2000))); Thompson v. Goetzmann, 337
F.3d 489, 497 n.20 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Dictionaries are a principle source for ascertaining the ordinary meaning of statutory language.”); CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint
Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1223 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]o determine the common usage or
ordinary meaning of a term, courts often turn to dictionary definitions for guidance.”);
Looking It Up, supra note 18, at 1438-40 (noting the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on dictionaries).
78
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 160 (8th ed. 2004). Interestingly, this definition is
directly supportive of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits’ minority rule—more so, even,
than the Webster’s definition.
79
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 180 (2002). Interestingly,
The Chicago Manual of Style prefers not to use “upon” with “based.” THE CHICAGO
MANUAL OF STYLE ¶ 5.209 (15th ed. 2003). We can safely assume, however, that this
stylistic preference does not lend a difference in interpretation to the phrase.
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80

entries. This is, however, precisely where intuition would guide the
court in any event. This definition does no work in determining
whether a lawsuit brought by a qui tam litigant can be heard. The
court already knows that the question is one of the foundational information supporting the claim; what it does not know is when that
information supports a claim and when it does not. Indeed, the problem seems to stem from whether it is linguistically correct to look past
“public disclosure of” and jump straight to “allegations or transac81
tions” in determining what the action is “based upon.”
The point of this investigation is to underscore that the circuit
split is not so much a question of the meaning of “based upon” as it is
of the function that this well-understood phrase plays in a larger context. Thus, the question of “plain meaning” must be a deeper issue
than can be resolved by simple dictionary definitions. The Seventh
and Fourth Circuits are adamant in their position that “plain meaning” supports their view, but the dictionary alone has not borne this out.
All is not lost for this small phrase, however. It will be helpful,
once we have the full hierarchical structure of the larger phrases
worked out, to be able to plug the structure into a function that can
tell us the meaning of the phrase. This analysis assumes the “derived
82
from” definition, which is supported directly by the Seventh and
83
Fourth Circuits, and noted with some approval even by courts adopt-

80

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 180 (2002).
For an argument that this jump to “allegations or transactions” is indeed
proper, see Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health System Corp., 276 F.3d
1032, 1044-47 (8th Cir. 2002). The Eighth Circuit acknowledges that the wording of
the statute directly implies the Fourth and Seventh Circuits’ reading, but it argues that
the wording is simply inartful—while simultaneously arguing that it is “inconceivable
that Congress would have drafted the statute so poorly as to have included a provision
that could never have any effect.” Id. at 1045. Here, the court is referring to the concern that reading the bar as banning only actions derived from public disclosures would
render the original-source provision useless. Id. The reasoning assumes that the
original source’s action will (allegedly) always be based on the underlying information,
not the actual public disclosure. Id. This interpretation suffers from a narrowness of
vision—it assumes that if an action is derived directly from a set of facts, it cannot also
be derived from the public release of those facts. However, the case itself likely concerns the precise allegations released publicly by the litigant, thereby making the basis
of the case the allegations themselves, as well as the facts that support them.
82
See United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, L.L.C., 496 F.3d 730, 736-39 (7th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1246 (2008).
83
See United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1347-49
(4th Cir. 1994).
81
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ing the majority rule, notably the Eighth and Third Circuits.
Adopting this definition, we can formulate a lambda-calculus function
for “based upon” in the following way:
||based upon|| = {Ȝ(X,Y ): X is derived from Y }
That is, “based upon” is a function that takes two arguments—one
that is to the left of “based upon” in the sentence (X), and one to the
right (Y)—and returns the set of all possible worlds in which the argument to the left is derived from the argument to the right. The following tree structures will determine what can be the left- and righthand arguments for “based upon.” The analysis begins with the righthand argument, as that is the portion of the PDJB that has created the
most controversy.
2. Building the Syntactic Structure
a. The Right-Hand Argument of “Based Upon”
To begin studying a phrase—and derive the hierarchical structure—it is helpful to break the phrase down into “constituent
phrases.” Constituent phrases are segments of sentences that can be
naturally spoken independently from the sentence while retaining
86
their meaning.
Thus, the language of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)
relevant to the circuit split can be productively broken down into the
three following constituent phrases:
1. “allegations or transactions”;
2. “the public disclosure of allegations or transactions”; and
3. “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions.”

84

See Minn. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1045-46. The Eighth Circuit also
notes that “[t]he split of authority is not quite as lopsided as it seems, for the issue has
provoked spirited disagreements in some circuits that have adopted the majority view.”
Id. at 1045 n.8.
85
See United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth., 186 F.3d 376, 385-86 (3d Cir.
1999) (“[A] relator’s action is ‘based upon’ a public disclosure of allegations only
where the relator has actually derived from that disclosure the allegations upon which
his qui tam action is based.”).
86
See, e.g., FROMKIN & RODMAN, supra note 60, at 112 (discussing constituent
phrases as evidence of hierarchical structure).
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These three phrases will frame the analysis of the “plain meaning”
of the FCA jurisdictional bar. Tellingly, the phrase “based upon,”
standing alone, is not an independently meaningful phrase, which
further confirms that the semantic definition, above, of “based upon”
as a function is correct—as a function, its meaning depends on its
context.
i. “Allegations or Transactions”
The “allegations or transactions” mentioned in the PDJB constitutes the smallest independently understandable phrase in the bar.
The meaning of “allegations or transactions” does not depend on the
immediate context of the sentence, but rather on the context of the
87
statute as a whole and on court decisions interpreting it. The precise
meaning of “allegations or transactions” is not particularly relevant to
this inquiry, as our question is whether the PDJB precludes actions
“based upon” the “allegations or transactions” themselves or their
“public disclosure.”
For reasons of space, this analysis will ignore any internal structure
to the “or” construction in this phrase. The entire phrase will be considered an OrP (for “‘or’ phrase”), and the existence of a more complicated internal structure will be marked by a closed triangular
88
branch between the phrase and the elements, as shown below.
Figure 5: Tree Structure of “Allegations or Transactions”
...
OrP
allegations or transactions

ii. “The Public Disclosure of Allegations or Transactions”
Expanding our view of the statute slightly to include the noun
“the public disclosure,” the meaning starts to crystallize. To illustrate
this phenomenon visually, consider the following tree representation:

87

See cases cited supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
See RADFORD, supra note 2, at 54 (“[I]t is quite common to use a ‘triangle’ to
represent constituents with a complex internal structure that you don’t choose to represent.”).
88
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Figure 6: Tree Structure of “the Public Disclosure of
Allegations or Transactions”
DP
D
the

AP

A
public

NP
Nƍ
PP

N
disclosure
P
of

OrP

allegations or transactions

Figure 6 shows the hierarchical relationship between the noun,
“disclosure,” and the prepositional phrase, “of allegations or transactions.” In linguistic terms, the prepositional phrase is a “complement”
to the noun phrase, and its contribution to the sentence is encapsu89
lated in its relationship to the noun phrase. Here, “of allegations or
transactions” singles out those particular public disclosures that concern the reader. This point may seem obvious, but it is nevertheless
essential to a proper interpretation of the statutory language.
iii. “Based Upon the Public Disclosure of Allegations or Transactions”
Finally, Figure 7 below shows the tree structure for the largest
constituent phrase, “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions.” As Figure 7 illustrates, the structure continues upward
hierarchically. The structure makes clear that the adjective “based”
takes a prepositional phrase as its object, here headed by “upon.”
This prepositional phrase in turn takes an object, in this case “the
public disclosure of allegations or transactions.” Simplifying slightly,
the phrase “based upon” takes an object, which here consists of a
certain subset of “public disclosures,” relating to “allegations or
transactions.”

89

See id. at 175-79 (developing the notion of “complements” and differentiating
between complements and “adjuncts”—a fascinating distinction, but one that does not
bear on this analysis).
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Figure 6: Tree Structure of “Based Upon the Public Disclosure of
Allegations or Transactions”
AP
A
based

PP

P
upon

DP

D
the

AP

A
public

NP
Nƍ
PP

N
disclosure
P
of

OrP

allegations or transactions

The tree structure of the PDJB further reveals that the phrase
leaves no room for structural ambiguity. Importantly, it is impossible
for the phrase “allegations or transactions” to attach higher than
“public disclosure,” which therefore precludes a reading in which
“based upon” takes “allegations or transactions” as its object, bypassing
90
“public disclosure” or relegating it to an adjectival role.
b. The Left-Hand Argument of “Based Upon”
Interestingly, there are a few instances of structural ambiguity in
the PDJB—two attachment-height ambiguities similar to the ambiguity
90

An interesting criticism of this conclusion comes from the Third Circuit:

In light of this apparent lack of precision, we are hesitant to attach too much
significance to a fine parsing of the syntax of § 3730(e)(4)(A). We find Section 3730(e)(4)(A) to be syntactically ambiguous because we are uncertain
that the drafters of that provision focused on the difference in precise usage
between, on the one hand, a suit based upon a public disclosure of an allegation or transaction and, on the other, a suit based upon an allegation or
transaction and that has been publicly disclosed.
Mistick, 186 F.3d at 388. While the Third Circuit’s criticism is on point with this Comment’s analysis, it is somewhat questionable, as it finds ambiguity not because of any
actual syntactic ambiguity, but because the drafters could have chosen an alternative
syntax. This argument is contradictory: given the option between two unambiguous
syntactic expressions, even a careless choice of one over another should be considered
a resolution of the supposed ambiguity.
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in the “Sherlock” example discussed above, one of which relates to
the intuitively unambiguous left-hand argument of “based upon.”
These ambiguities regard the attachment of the phrases “under this
section” and “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or trans92
actions.” The former is irrelevant to this discussion, but the latter
directly relates to the phrase in question, and creates some potential
confusion as to what the left-hand argument of “based upon” is.
Recall that the PDJB states that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction
over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of
93
allegations or transactions.”
As can be seen in the following two
trees, it is syntactically unclear whether the “based upon” phrase
modifies “jurisdiction” or “action”—that is, whether it is the basis of
the jurisdiction or the basis of the action that is in question.
This ambiguity serves to highlight the importance of considering
more than just “plain meaning” in construing statutes because, the
structural ambiguity notwithstanding, the “based upon” phrase is not
a confusing aspect of the sentence. The “action” in the PDJB is uncontestedly interpreted as being modified by the “based upon” phrase.
This uniform interpretation is linguistically explainable. The phrase
“an action based upon” (or, as here, “an action under this section
94
based upon”) may be a legal idiom, or it may be that “jurisdiction
based upon the public disclosure” is so intuitively unlikely to be the
intent of the “speaker” from the lawyer’s or judge’s position that it is
discarded. But neither account offers further insight into the meaning of the law.

91

See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
The ambiguity is whether “under this section” modifies “action” or “shall have
jurisdiction.” For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that it is the action that
arises under this section, as jurisdiction is already provided by federal question jurisdiction unless specifically revoked.
93
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006).
94
I am indebted to Professor David Pesetsky for pointing out this possibility. It is
possible that in this idiomatic sense, the idiom “an action based upon” could actually
carry the meaning “an action supported by,” and thereby make some sense of the
Tenth Circuit’s declaration that “based upon” is understood to mean “supported by.”
United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir.
1992); see also infra note 109 and accompanying text. This explanation does not fit,
however, with the Tenth Circuit’s claim that its interpretation of “based upon” is the
“common usage.” Precision Co., 971 F.2d at 552. Regardless, the use of “an action
based upon” as a legal idiom may warrant further investigation, though it is beyond the
scope of this Comment. For a discussion of idioms and their importance to the development of linguistic theory, see RADFORD, supra note 2, at 319-20.
92
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Figure 7: Tree Structure No. 1 of PDJB, “Action Based Upon”
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Figure 8: Tree Structure No. 2 of PDJB, “Jurisdiction Based Upon”
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c. Resolving the Meaning of the PDJB
It is now possible to plug in the left- and right-hand arguments to
the semantic definition derived above to arrive at the linguistic meaning of the PDJB. Recall that the definition was:
{Ȝ(X,Y ): X is derived from Y }.
Plugging in the arguments derived above for X and Y provides:
{Ȝ(action, public disclosure): action is derived from public disclosure}.
As can be seen, the PDJB “based upon” phrase directly relates the
derivation of the action to the public disclosure, and not to the allegations or transactions.
Of course, all the foregoing linguistic analysis does no more than
show that a natural English speaker’s intuition is correct. Though it
validates the Seventh Circuit’s pronouncement that its interpretation
is in fact the plain-language interpretation, this analysis does not address the argument noted by the Third Circuit that Congress was simply careless and intended the PDJB to be read either as regarding “the
public disclosure of allegations or transactions” or “publicly disclosed
allegations or transactions.” While humans make innumerable minor
linguistic mistakes in phrasing regularly, the distinction between these
two phrases is so marked as to preclude any indifference on the drafters’ part. Consider the following minor adjustments to these phrases:
1. No court shall have jurisdiction over an action based upon
the public disclosure of murder.
2. No court shall have jurisdiction over an action based upon
95
publicly disclosed murder.
The distinction between these two sentences should be clear to
any native speaker of English—the first seems to be a valid act for the
protection of witnesses to murders against charges going to their coming forward; the second is a nonsensical license to commit murder, so
long as the perpetrator subsequently announces her guilt. That a leg-

95

Once again, my thanks to Professor David Pesetsky for these examples.
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islature could possibly confuse the two—or intend that a statute stating
the former could be read in either way—seems absurd.
III. THE NONTEXTUAL RATIONALE FOR ADOPTING THE MINORITY RULE
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits’ reading of “based upon” in the
FCA jurisdictional bar is in fact supported by linguistic evidence as the
plain meaning of the statute. The question, then, is whether the linguistic evidence—and the fact of plain meaning—fully justifies the
adoption of this reading by the Supreme Court. Given the bar’s purpose of preventing parasitic lawsuits while simultaneously encouraging
96
whistleblowers, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits’ reading is supported both on linguistic and policy grounds, and it should be
adopted.
A resolution to the interpretation of the jurisdictional bar must
incorporate treatment not only of the linguistic plain-language interpretation, but also of the core policy behind the FCA and its jurisdictional bar. To this end, a full review of the various circuit opinions
addressing the issue is in order.
A. The Majority Case
Among the rationales advanced for adopting the majority rule by
97
the various circuit courts are the good, the bad, and the ugly. The
good reasons include the notions that the FCA contains “safeguards
98
against [a] multiplicity of suits” regarding the same fraud, that a re99
strictive reading serves the needs of judicial economy, that finding
more actions to be “based upon” public disclosures subjects them to
100
the more important “original source” analysis, and that “[o]nce the

96
97
98

See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
With apologies to Sergio Leone.
Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 567 (11th Cir.

1994).
99

As the Tenth Circuit explains,

[A] more restrictive interpretation of “based upon” is consistent with practical
considerations of judicial economy. It is one thing to expect the court to
evaluate the quantity and quality of information in the public domain versus
that possessed by the qui tam plaintiff after trial for purposes of fee determination; it is quite another to expect a similar evaluation as part of a pre-trial jurisdictional inquiry.
Precision, 971 F.2d at 553 (footnote omitted).
100
Cooper, 19 F.3d at 568 n.10 (citing Precision, 971 F.2d at 552).
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information is in the public domain, there is less need for a financial
101
incentive to spur individuals into exposing frauds.”
While the foregoing reasons are indeed good—that is, logically
sound—there are countervailing reasons to adopt the minority interpretation that tend to weigh more heavily. As against the first reason,
multiple suits stemming from the same fraud are not in fact prevented
by the bar, so long as each qui tam litigant independently qualifies as
102
an original source.
Second, determining whether the plaintiff’s action is “based upon” a public disclosure is surely not more difficult
than determining whether the plaintiff is an “original source”—and
indeed, it may reduce the number of cases in which such originalsource determinations need to be made. It is thus unclear that judicial economy is better served by the majority rule. Third, it is substantially unclear that the original-source determination is really more im103
portant than the “based upon” determination.
Finally, the notion
that whistleblowing becomes less efficient once information is in the
public domain is flawed on three counts: (1) the bar does not speak
104
of information, but rather allegations and transactions; (2) the public disclosure of allegations or transactions may not be readily or obvi105
ously attainable, even though public; and (3) this position is entirely
backwards looking—it does not account for the dampening effect on

101

United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 685
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
102
See United States ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 5 F.3d 407, 410 (9th Cir.
1993) (“[T]here may be more than one original source eligible to bring suit . . . .”).
103
The Eleventh Circuit cites to a House Judiciary Committee hearing in arguing
that the original-source provision is intended to play a large role in preventing parasitic suits while encouraging legitimate whistleblowing. Cooper, 19 F.3d at 568 n.10 (citing False Claims Act Implementation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 5 (1990) (statement
of Sen. Charles Grassley)). It is not clear, however, that Congress intended that the
rest of the section be rendered subservient to that provision, or that Congress did not
intend that both the “based upon” criteria and the original-source determination be
used to that effect.
104
This point is made in United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Railway. Co. v.
Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1994), but the opinion misstates the law as
“bar[ring] suits based on publicly disclosed ‘allegations or transactions,’ not information,” converting the noun “disclosure” into the adjective “disclosed,” thereby obscuring the provision’s meaning.
105
See Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 14 F.3d at 655 (“Expertise in the field of engineering would not in itself give a qui tam plaintiff the basis for suit when all the material elements of fraud are publicly available, though not readily comprehensible to
nonexperts.”).

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

952

[Vol. 157: 923

future whistleblowers who may fear that their own actions will be pre106
empted by releases that they may not be able to predict or prevent.
The lone “bad” reason used to justify the majority rule is that
“[t]he [FCA] jurisdictional requirements are designed to restrict the
number of persons who can bring qui tam actions and thereby avoid
107
parasitic suits.” This reasoning is “bad” as a matter of logical reasoning: reducing the number of potential litigants is not a surefire way of
reducing abuse. Consider a putative qui tam law that allows only the
author of this Comment to bring qui tam actions. In such a case, virtually every qui tam action brought would be a parasitic action, in spite
of the drastic reduction in the number of qui tam litigants.
Finally, there is the “ugly” reason—ugly in the sense that it falls
into the category of linguistic claims that cause legal-linguistics schol108
ars to shy away from linguistic decision making.
It posits a boldfaced lie about the plain meaning of the statute. The assertion is that
“[a]s a matter of common usage, the phrase ‘based upon’ is properly
109
understood to mean ‘supported by.’”
This construction of the
phrase falls somewhere between the question at issue in the circuit
split—the interpretation of “based upon”—and the question resolved
by Rockwell—reliance in any part on public disclosure removes jurisdiction. That is, the court confuses the question of what “based upon”
means with whether an action can depend upon both public disclo-

106

It is possible, though perhaps far-fetched, to envision a case in which a potential qui tam plaintiff is about to “publicly disclose” information to the government
when, by a sudden stroke of luck, the fraudulent actor discovers the whistleblower’s
intent and moves immediately to disclose the information, thereby destroying the whistleblower’s cause of action. And, even in more pedestrian situations, the fear that part
of the whistleblower’s claim depends upon some small piece of previously disclosed
information—information that the whistleblower either does not at the outset know is
public or does not know that she needs—may well deter her from coming forward.
This is particularly true pursuant to Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, which
destroys a whistleblower’s chance of recovery if her complaint, as amended, ever rests
on public information. 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1408-09 (2007). Most importantly, because
the problem of fraud is ongoing, it is like a repeated game—and if potential whistleblowers choose their strategy based on the outcomes attained by other whistleblowers,
these failures of the system will only serve to make future whistleblowers less forthcoming. See generally DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 146-60 (1991) (developing the theory of repeated games with observable actions).
107
United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 940
(6th Cir. 1997).
108
See SOLAN, supra note 29, at 176 (noting the judicial tendency to disguise judgments made on other grounds as decisions forced by the language of the statute).
109
United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552 (10th
Cir. 1992).
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sures and independently obtained information. Because the court
does not contemplate the distinction between these questions, it is
forced to invent a bizarre new definition for the phrase “based
upon”—thus “supported by.”
B. The Minority Case
The minority rule has been shown to be the plain meaning of the
statute. This “derived from” interpretation, however, has more to
recommend it than syntax trees and semantic functions—it also implements the statutory purpose. Considering the intent and purpose
cited by virtually all of the circuit courts—“[s]eeking the golden mean
between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders . . . and dis110
couragement of opportunistic plaintiffs” —the minority rule is a fitting interpretation of the law. Further, if one adopts the textualist
view that “[c]ongressional intent need be ascertained, if at all, from
111
the plain language of the statute,” then the linguistic evidence provided in favor of the minority view bolsters its case still further. Indeed, it is hard to determine how the “derived from” interpretation
could lead to an increase in parasitic lawsuits, while it is easy to see
that it can encourage whistleblowing.
Suppose, for example, that Willy Whistleblower wishes to expose
the fraud of his employer, an insurance company, by using inside information that he has amassed for years. Suppose that, not knowing
how best to proceed, Willy takes his case to the federal official who
112
handles his company’s account.
On these facts, either of the two
113
rules will allow Willy to bring action as an original source.
Suppose
110

United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
111
See, e.g., Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1997) (Farris,
J., dissenting).
112
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, L.L.C., 496 F.3d 730, 736
(7th Cir. 2007) (“Disclosure of information to a competent public official about an alleged false claim against the government [is a] public disclosure . . . when the disclosure is made to one who has managerial responsibility for the very claims being made.”
(alteration in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Mathews v. Bank of Farmington,
166 F.3d 853, 861 (7th Cir. 1999))), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1246 (2008).
113
This illustration highlights the fallacy promoted by Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse
Anesthetists v. Allina Health System Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1045 (8th Cir. 2002), discussed
supra note 81, that the minority rule would render the original-source provision superfluous. Indeed, it is clear that in this case Willy’s entire action is “derived from” the
very allegations that Willy himself made public—that is, Willy brought allegations of
fraud to the attention of the public and then proceeded to base a lawsuit off of those
allegations. The fact that Willy has independent knowledge of the facts underlying the
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that the situation is changed slightly, however, such that Willy is still in
possession of all the same information, but some sufficient amount of
114
that information is made public by the company a few days prior to
Willy’s decision to act. Under the minority rule, Willy’s cause of action remains good: he has not derived his suit from the public disclo115
sure of allegations or transactions, so jurisdiction remains.
Under
the majority interpretation, however, Willy is now out of luck: his diligent recordkeeping and secrecy have been rendered meaningless by
the malfeasant company’s act. Despite the fact that Willy is still in the
best position to bring suit on behalf of the government—he has been
collecting information for years, while the federal authorities have
probably not even read about this situation in the news—he is barred
because he did not “play some part in the original public disclosure of
116
the allegations made in his suit.” This outcome seems wrong in two
ways. First, allowing the wrongdoer to prevent a whistleblower from
profiting seems inequitable, and second, requiring potential whistleblowers to wade through all of the wrongdoer’s public disclosures
prior to filing suit would probably strongly discourage such behav117
ior, in direct contradiction to the statutory purpose.
On the other hand, consider the case of Otto Opportunist, who
scours SEC reports and various other public records day by day in
hope of uncovering a massive fraud being perpetrated right under the
government’s nose. Supposing that Otto has a better nose for funny
business than the federal government, and he is able to stumble upon

allegations made public does not bear on the case, as, pursuant to Rockwell’s reasoning,
“[i]t is difficult to understand why Congress would care whether a relator knows about
the information underlying a publicly disclosed allegation.” Rockwell Int’l Corp. v.
United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1407 (2007).
114
That is, the company discloses information amounting to an “allegation or
transaction” under the FCA—an amount at least equal to “X + Y,” the elements of a
transaction, in the terminology of Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 14 F.3d at 653-54 (italics
added).
115
Note that the additional Rockwell bar against claims based partially on publicly
disclosed allegations is not triggered where the action is not “based upon” public disclosure of allegations, because the court does not need to enter into original-source
determination at all. Rockwell applies only to cases involving the original-source provision. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1401.
116
Chen-Cheng Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing
United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1990)).
117
It is difficult to see how potential whistleblowers are in a better position to
make determinations about the “quantity and quality of information in the public domain versus that possessed by the qui tam plaintiff” when making such determinations
is too taxing for the judicial economy to bear. United States ex rel. Precision Co. v.
Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 553 (10th Cir. 1992).
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a scheme early enough to file suit before the local prosecutor, his suit
will be barred under the minority rule just as it would under the majority rule. In the case of Opportunist, so long as his information is
drawn solely from the public record, any action that he files must necessarily be actually derived from the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions—there is simply no other way for him to obtain the necessary information. If, on the other hand, Otto decides to snoop
around and uncovers fraud based on his own observation of nonpublic activity (for example, if he discovers illegal pollution), then he is in
the position of any other whistleblower: he has information not in the
public record and therefore should be encouraged by the FCA to
bring suit. As in the preceding example, Otto’s legitimate case based
on his own investigation would be precluded by the majority rule, but
his illegitimate case based on public data would not be saved by the
minority rule. Thus, any concern that the minority rule will be too lax
seems unfounded—as does any expectation that the majority rule will
118
bar more illegitimate claims.
C. Putting It Together
The argument for the majority interpretation rests entirely on policy and imputed congressional intent, while the argument for the minority interpretation rests on policy, congressional intent, and linguistics. Taking these arguments into account, a future court should
decide to adopt the minority interpretation as the more sound option.
Indeed, most of the policy goals furthered by the majority rule are
119
better achieved through the minority rule.
Congressional intent,
similarly, sits squarely in the corner of the minority rule, which does
much more to encourage whistleblowing and is equally effective at deterring—or at least barring—parasitic suits. The minority rule may
indeed lead to more qui tam plaintiffs recovering a percentage of the
government’s awards, which represents a significant cost to the government—but only when compared to a world in which the government has the information to proceed without the help of whistleblowers. In the real world there is an economy of information, and
118

Contra, e.g., United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123
F.3d 935, 940 (6th Cir. 1997) (arguing that the reduction in potential qui tam claimants
because of the majority rule will necessarily reduce the number of illegitimate suits).
119
The one exception, perhaps, is judicial economy, which will probably suffer
from the allowance of more suits, as predicted by Precision, 971 F.2d at 553. These increased suits are the price of seeking to encourage parties to come forward, however,
and it appears to be a price that Congress was willing to pay.
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increasing incentives to information holders—potential whistleblow120
ers—serves to “make the pie higher.”
Thus, if there is such a thing
121
as the Laffer Curve for fraud recovery, it is embodied in the majority
rule: by attempting to secure more of the recovery revenue for the
government, the rule destroys the incentive to create that revenue.
The policy rationale for the minority rule, taken together with its
faithfulness to the plain meaning of the statute, argues strongly for its
adoption.
CONCLUSION
If the question of interpreting the PDJB reaches the Supreme
Court, the outcome will be difficult to guess. Justice Alito has written
in support of the majority rule in the past—he authored the opinion
122
of the Third Circuit adopting the rule in that jurisdiction, and he
expressed skepticism about the syntactic plain-language argument for
123
the minority rule.
His vote, however, cannot be considered firmly
on the side of the majority, as his opinion in Mistick “agree[d] with the
Fourth Circuit that in ordinary usage the phrase ‘based upon’ is not
124
generally used to mean ‘supported by.’”
Further complicating matters, the plain-meaning interpretation of the minority rule tends to increase the number of potential qui tam litigants, which cuts against
the views of those Justices otherwise amenable to plain-language ar125
guments.
The PDJB would not be the first question on which the

120

Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., Political Tongue Twisters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2000, at A17
(quoting then-presidential candidate George W. Bush). The more common phrase, of
course, is to “make the pie larger.”
121
See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Time, and the Laffer Curve,
90 J. POL. ECON. 816, 817-18 (1982) (describing the Laffer Curve’s posited inverse relation between tax rates and revenue).
122
United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth., 186 F.3d 376, 388 (3d Cir. 1999).
123
See id. (finding the PDJB’s language “syntactically ambiguous”).
124
Id. at 386.
125
For instance, Justice Scalia authored the opinion in Rockwell, which significantly
limited the scope of the original-source exception to the jurisdictional bar.
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otherwise textualist justices sided against linguistic evidence, but it
127
would certainly be one of the most clearly unambiguous cases.

126

Indeed, Justice Scalia “think[s] it not contrary to sound principles of interpretation, in . . . extreme cases, to give the totality of context precedence over a single
word.” Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
3, 20-21 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
127
Justice Alito has, however, already clearly sided against linguistic evidence by
contending that careless structural choice led to syntactic ambiguity in the PDJB. See
Mistick, 186 F.3d at 388; supra text accompanying note 95.

